Abbas Kardan
Numerous think tanks, academic chairs, research prizes, and specialized policy forums in Iran bear the prefix or suffix “Middle East” and devote their analytical efforts to this region. Yet surprisingly little attention is paid to a more fundamental question: what is the nature of the “Middle East” itself, and how does it relate to Iran’s national interests? The prevailing assumption appears to be one of inevitability, as if Iran were condemned to permanent entanglement with this region. This issue becomes particularly problematic when some actors go so far as to justify Iran’s national interests precisely through deep involvement in the Middle East’s chronic crises.The Middle East, whose formation dates back roughly a century, can be examined through three analytically distinct but interconnected dimensions: geographical, geopolitical, and the constructivist dimension of regional order. This distinction helps clarify that the “Middle East” is not a self-evident or natural entity, but rather the product of historical processes, discursive practices, and strategic calculations, largely driven by great powers.From a geographical perspective, what is conventionally labeled the Middle East refers to a vast area that took shape after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Iran in the east to Morocco in the west and encompassing two distinct geographical realms: West Asia and North Africa. However, according to the criteria of physical geography, no independent and coherent region called the “Middle East” can be identified. Nor can a unified geographical identity be attributed to it. This expanse is neither a subcontinent nor characterized by a single natural continuity. Iran belongs to the Iranian Plateau; Anatolia constitutes a distinct peninsula; the Arabian Peninsula forms a separate geographical unit; the Levant exhibits a Mediterranean structure; and Egypt and territories west of it are fundamentally embedded in African geography. There is therefore no shared natural foundation that could meaningfully bind these heterogeneous spaces into a single geographical region.In geopolitical terms, the Middle East is best understood as a construct shaped by the strategic needs of great powers. The concept emerged in the early twentieth century within the Eurocentric worldview of Britain and, later, the United States—a worldview that organized global space in relation to perceived centers of power. Within this framework, the Middle East acquired significance as a strategic zone for controlling vital maritime and communication routes, managing energy resources, and containing rival powers. From the outset, the boundaries of this construct were fluid and subject to shifting security considerations and geopolitical interests. This very fluidity underscores the fact that the Middle East, in geopolitical terms, functions less as a fixed spatial reality than as an analytical and operational tool of power politics.At the constructivist level, this geopolitical framework was gradually stabilized through security-oriented discourses. The Middle East was persistently represented as a “region of crisis,” thereby legitimizing external intervention, sustained military presence, and externally imposed political orders. In this process, the deep historical, civilizational, and geographical diversity of the societies within this space was subsumed under a single security narrative. Rather than being understood as a collection of distinct and varied societies, the region came to be framed as a permanent problem on the agenda of international security. In this sense, the Middle East is not primarily an objective or natural reality, but a product of the interaction between power, knowledge, and geopolitical discourse—ultimately crystallizing as a regional construct aligned with the interests of great powers.The first step in this process of regional construction is naming. The very term “Middle East” produces a shared cognitive framework that brings together disparate territories under a single label and enables them to be conceived, analyzed, and governed as a coherent “region.”The second step involves representation. Through media narratives, academic scholarship, and policy discourse, a particular image of the Middle East—typically as unstable, crisis-ridden, or inherently problematic—is continuously reproduced. This process reinforces the perception of regional unity by obscuring historical, cultural, and geographical differences behind an overarching and homogenizing image. Over time, the Middle East becomes internalized by both domestic and international audiences as a singular and coherent entity.The third step is securitization. In this phase, diverse and localized developments across different countries are reframed as interconnected or collective threats. Insecurity in one part of the region is thus portrayed as a danger to the Middle East as a whole, transforming the region into a unified security space. This securitization not only shapes external perceptions of the Middle East but also influences how regional actors themselves interpret threats and formulate their policies.Taken together, these processes indicate that the Middle East, as a regional construct, owes far more to the discourses, policies, and strategic decisions of great powers—particularly Britain and the United States in the twentieth century—than to any natural or geographical necessity. Through naming, representation, and securitization, these powers produced a shared image of the region and defined its boundaries and operational logic. From this perspective, the Middle East can be understood as an externally constructed geopolitical entity whose coherence and persistence have been shaped by global power interests.This does not mean, however, that the effects of this construct on regional states have been entirely deterministic. Turkey, for example, gradually adopted a Eurocentric orientation and deliberately limited its engagement with Middle Eastern affairs, only turning back toward the region in the 1990s as the international system changed and new opportunities emerged. Arab states, meanwhile, never fully incorporated either Iran or Israel into their own conception of Middle Eastern identity. Their opposition to the establishment of Israel in the western Arab lands and their adoption of Iran-centric threat perceptions in the east can be understood within this broader identity framework. More recently, and under U.S. pressure, efforts have been made to construct a shared identity for Arabs and Israelis by emphasizing a common Abrahamic lineage.Iran’s case, however, is distinct. Despite its linguistic, cultural, and religious differences from most Middle Eastern societies, the regional construct imposed by great powers appears to have fostered a deterministic mindset among Iranian policymakers—one that leaves little room for imagining alternatives beyond the Middle East. As a result, Iran’s foreign policy orientation has remained largely fixed on this region, often inadvertently aligning with the strategic interests of external powers. At various historical moments, Iran has been assigned shifting roles within this framework: as part of Britain’s “Islamic belt” to contain the Soviet Union; as the U.S.-backed “regional gendarme” responsible for securing the Persian Gulf; and, following the Islamic Revolution, as a “revisionist power” whose portrayal serves to justify the continued presence and intervention of external actors. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the fate of Iran—a pre-existing political entity with a history spanning several millennia—should be so tightly bound to that of artificially engineered states in this constructed region, rendering it inevitably entangled in their crises and conflicts.In sum, the Middle East is a constructed space shaped both by the designs of great powers and by the acceptance, adaptation, or resistance of regional actors. Yet unlike many other states, Iran does not possess an inherent Middle Eastern identity, nor does it face the kind of geographical confinement that compels Israel to anchor itself firmly within this region. Precisely for this reason, Iran has the capacity to challenge the dominant regional construct imposed by great powers and to redefine its regional identity in relation to alternative regions and partnerships. At a time when Iran’s very existence is perceived to be under threat, this task is more urgent than ever and demands serious attention from those responsible for formulating the country’s grand strategy.
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